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The full effect of this appears in the first chapter of the "Itinerarium,"
in which we are told that God may be seen in His traces in the
physical world. This is the basis of what sometimes is called
natural theology; for if we can actually see the traces of God
about us in the order of natural law, then we have a start toward
knowledge of the divine mind which is sure. It is only a start,
Saint Bonaventura maintains, but it is the proper start. It means
that one does not have to be a great rationalist, an erudite
theologian, a doctor, to know religious truths. One has only to
look about one and observe that certain laws obtain; that there is
order; that all things are "disposed in weight, number, and
measure." This can be seen; and when it is seen, one has a
reflection of the divine mind in one's sensory experience. One has
only to contrast this with the method of Saint Thomas Aquinas in
the "Summa Theologica," in which God's existence is proved by a
series of rational arguments--where objections are analyzed,
authorities are consulted and weighed, multiple distinctions are
made, and the whole emphasis is upon reason rather than
observation. Saint Bonaventura seems to have as his purpose a
demonstration of God's existence and of His traits which is not
irrational but nonrational. That is, he would be far from saying
that his conclusions would not stand up under rational criticism,
but would insist that his method, to use modern language, is
empirical rather than rational. To take a trivial example from
another field, we could prove that a person had committed a crime
either by circumstantial evidence or by direct testimony. If we
can produce two or three persons who actually saw him commit the
crime, we do not feel that we must corroborate what they say by a
rational demonstration that he could have committed it, that he
had a motive for committing it, that he threatened to commit it,
that no one else could have committed it, and so on. We like to
think that a good case gives us both kinds of evidence, but
frequently we have to be satisfied with one type or bits of both
types. Saint Bonaventura might be compared to the man who insists
on direct testimony; Saint Thomas to him who puts his trust
exclusively in circumstantial evidence, though the comparison
would be superficial. It would be superficial since both would
agree that God's existence could be shown in both ways.
The method of direct observation by which one is made certain of
one's beliefs leads step by step to the mystic vision. The mystic,
like the strict empiricist, has a kind of knowledge which is
indisputable. No one can deny what the mystic sees any more than
one can deny what the sensory observer sees. The philosopher who
bases all knowledge upon the direct observation of colors, sounds,
shapes, and so on, has knowledge which he readily admits is
uncommunicable, in spite of the fact that most of us use words for
our elementary sensations in the same ways. But whether John Doe,
who is looking upon a patch of red, sees precisely what Richard
Roe sees, could be doubted and has been doubted. For the
psychological equipment, the sensory apparatus of the two men may
and probably does contribute something to even the most simple
sensory experiences. If Messrs. Doe and Roe are exactly alike in
all relevant ways, then one may reasonably conclude that their
sensations are exactly alike. But nevertheless Roe would not be
having Doe's sensation, for each man is the terminus of causal
events which diverge from a given point and which cease to be
identical once they have entered the human body Thus a bell may be
ringing and therefore giving off air waves. When these air waves
enter the body of Roe, they are no longer the same waves which
have entered the body of Doe for Roe's auditory nerves, no matter
how similar to Doe's, are not existentially identical with them.
If we distinguish between existential and qualitative identity,
and we all do, then we may say that Doe and Roe have qualitatively
identical but existentially nonidentical sensations. Until Roe can
hear with Doe's ears and auditory nerves and auditory brain
centers, he will never experience Doe's auditory sensations.
Similarly with the mystic vision. If one man has such a vision, he
is not made uneasy the fact that another does not have it. The
other man has only to follow the discipline which will lead him to
it. Saint Bonaventura traces the steps on this road, one by one,
until he reaches his goal.
The mysticism of Saint Bonaventura was peculiar in that it was
based on a theory of knowledge in which all degrees of knowledge
were similarly direct, immediate, and nonrational. One sees God's
traces in the sensory world; one sees His image in the mind; one
sees His goodness in human goodness; one sees His powers in the
operations of our own powers--it is always a question of direct
seeing. Thus we have the possibility of real, rather than
notional, assent in all fields of knowledge. We are not forced to
know about things; we can know them. We have, to use other
familiar terms, direct acquaintance with, rather than descriptions
of, them. In other words, there is never any real need for
rational discourse, for erudition. The simplest man of good will
can see God as clearly as the most learned scholar. That made a
philosophy such as this a perfect instrument for the Christian,
for throughout the Christian tradition ran a current of
anti-intellectualism. Christianity was held to be a religion, not
merely a body of abstract knowledge. It was an experience as well
as a theory. A man of faith could have as certain knowledge of God
as the man of learning. This did not discourage the Christian from
attempting to build up rational systems which would demonstrate to
the world of scholars what the religious man knew by faith. Far
from it. But what Kant was to say of the relationship between
concepts and precepts, the Christian could have said of that
between faith and reason, or religion and philosophy: faith
without reason is blind, reason without faith empty.
The difficulty with the extremists who maintained that either one
or the other faculty was sufficient was that faith and reason were
both supposed to assert something. Whether you believed by faith
or by reason, you believed in ideas which presumably made sense,
could be stated in words, could be true or false. If you believed
in one of these truths by faith, without reason, you were in the
position of a man who had no knowledge of what he was believing
nor why, nor even whether there was any good reason for believing
in it rather than its contradictory. It was all very well for a
man like Tertullian to maintain that there was more glory in
believing something irrational--inept--than in believing something
demonstrably true. Most Christian philosophers were anxious to put
a sound rational underpinning beneath their beliefs. Similarly, if
you had only rational knowledge, you were like a blind man who
might be convinced that there were such things as colors,
analogous to sounds and odors, but who had no direct acquaintance
with them; or again like a man who had read an eloquent
description of a great painting, but who had never seen it. Though
all Christians were in the position of maintaining that there were
some beliefs, those in the mysteries, which could not be
rationally demonstrated, nevertheless they all, including Saint
Bonaventura, pushed their rational demonstrations as far as they
were able. Thus Saint Bonaventura goes so far as to attempt a
dialectical proof of the dogma of the Trinity (Ch. VI), though he
realizes that such a proof is not sufficient for religion.
It is worth pointing out that Franciscan philosophy as a whole
tended to put more emphasis upon the observation of the natural
world than its great rival, Thomism, did. Even in the "Little
Flowers" of Saint Francis, only in a remote sense of the word a
philosophical work, there is a fondness for what we call Nature
which led him at times close to heresy. Later there were
Franciscans like Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and their great friend
and protector, Robert Grosseteste, whose interest in what we would
call science, as distinct from philosophy, was almost their main
interest. Indeed, one might without too much exaggeration maintain
that the impetus to the study of the natural world through
empirical methods came from the Franciscans. This appears in the
early chapters of the "Itinerarium," where observational science
becomes not simply the satisfaction of idle curiosity, but the
fulfillment of a religious obligation. But it goes without saying
that a man of science may discover truths which contradict what he
has believed on faith and that a man of faith may look to science,
not for everything which it is capable of revealing, but only for
those things which corroborate his faith. The best illustration of
this conflict is found in the use made of arithmetic by
allegorists, as early as Philo. Few mathematicians today would
play upon the curious properties of numbers--virgin numbers,
perfect numbers, superabundant numbers, numbers which are the sums
of such numbers as three and four--to prove religious truths. Few
men of religion would, I imagine, seek validation of their
religious beliefs in the properties of numbers, finding it
extraordinary that there are four Gospels, four points of the
compass, four winds, four elements (earth, water, air, and fire),
four seasons, four humors, four temperaments. But all men will
usually feel uneasy in the presence of contradiction and will do
their best to bring all their beliefs into harmony with one
another. The question reduces to the motivation of knowledge, the
question of why exploration is pushed into fields which previously
have been terrae incognitae. And when one compares science as it
was before the fourteenth century and that which it became after
that date, one sees that only a strong emotional propulsion would
have produced the change of interest. That propulsion, we are
suggesting, came from the Franciscans.
The student who has no acquaintance with the philosophy of Saint
Bonaventura can do no better than to begin with the "Itinerarium."
It is short and yet complete; it is typical of his manner of
thinking; and it
presents only the difficulties which any medieval philosophical
text presents. There is no need to hack one's way through a jungle
of
authorities, quotations, refutations, distinctions, and textual
exegeses. It is not a commentary on another man's book; it is a
straightforward
statement of a philosophical point of view. It illustrates the
manner in which its author's contemporaries and predecessors
utilized Biblical texts, and it also illustrates the knowledge of
physics and psychology which was current in the thirteenth
century. It is thus one of those representative documents which it
behooves all students of intellectual history to know. It should
be read with sympathy. One should accept its author's various
assumptions, both methodological and doctrinal, and begin from
there. There would be no point in trying to translate it in terms
of the twentieth century, for the attempt would fail. But
similarly one would not attempt to translate Dante's cosmology
into modern terms nor justify Chartres Cathedral in terms of
functional architecture as that is understood by modern engineers.
This book is a kind of prose poem, with a dramatic development of
its own as one rises from step to step toward a mystic vision of
God. That would seem to be the best approach which the beginner
could make to it.
ENDNOTES
1. The student will do well to read Philo's "Allegorical
Interpretation"
for examples of his method. The most readily available translation
is that of G. H. Whitaker in the Loeb Library. For a thorough
study of the whole matter, he should consult H. A. Wolfson s
"Philo" (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1949).
GEORGE BOAS
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
July, 1953
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Louis an London, 1946.
----, "Opera Omnia," As Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 10 vols., 1937.
Dady, Sister Mary Rachael, "The Theory of Knowledge of St.
Bonaventura," Washington, D. C., 1939.
De Benedictis, Matthew M., "The Social Thought of St.
Bonaventura,"
Washington, D. C., 1946.
Gilson, E. H., "La Philosophie de St. Bonaventure," Paris, 1924.
Healy, Sister Emma Therese, "Saint Bonaventura's De reductione
artium ad theologiam" (commentary with introduction and
translation), St. Bonaventura, N. Y., 1939.
Prentice, Robert P., "The Psychology of Love according to St.
Bonaventura," St. Bonaventura, N. Y., 1951.
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