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Ch 2. God commonly gives to all the
Just the grace necessary for the observance of the Commandments
and to all sinners the grace necessary for conversion
2. Obstinate or hardened sinners and abandonment of them by God
I know well that there are theologians who maintain that God
refuses to certain obstinate sinners even sufficient grace. And,
among others, they avail themselves of a position of St. Thomas,
who says: "But although they who are in sin cannot through their
own power avoid putting or interposing an obstacle to grace,
unless they are prevented by grace as we have shown;
nevertheless, this also is imputed to them as a sin, because
this defect is left in them from previous sin-----as a drunken
man is not excused from murder committed in that drunkenness
which was incurred by his own fault. Besides, although he who is
in sin has not this is his own power that he altogether avoid
sin, yet he has power at this present moment to avoid this or
that sin, as has been said; so that whatever he commits, he
commits voluntarily; and therefore it is properly imputed to him
as sin."
From this they gather that St. Thomas intends to say
that sinners can indeed avoid particular sins, but not all sins;
because in punishment for sins previously committed they are
deprived of all actual grace.
But we answer that here St. Thomas is not speaking of actual,
but of habitual or sanctifying grace, without which the sinner
cannot keep himself long from falling into new sins, as he
teaches in several places. And that he means the same in the
passage just quoted is clear from the context, which we must
here transcribe, in order to understand the true meaning of the
saint.
In the first place, the title of chapter clx., where the quotation
occurs, is as follows: "That man, when he is in sin, cannot avoid
sin without grace." The very title shows that St Thomas intended
no more that he has said in the other places which we have
referred to.
Moreover, in
the course of the chapter he says: "For when the mind of man has
declined from the state of uprightness, it is manifest that it
has fallen from its relation, 'order' [ordo], to its true end. .
. . Whensoever, therefore, anything shall have occurred to the
mind conducive to the inordinate end, but improper for the true
end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought back to its
due relation, so as to prefer its true end to all others; and
this is the effect of grace. But while anything repugnant to our
last end is the object of our choice, it puts a hindrance in the
way of the grace which conducts us to that end; whence it is
manifest that, after sinning, man cannot altogether abstain from
sin, before he is brought back by grace to the due order. And
hence the opinion of the Pelagians is shown to be absurd, that
man, being in sin, can without grace avoid [fresh] sin." And
then he goes on with the sentence quoted above: "But although
they," etc., of which our opponents make use.
So that, in the first place, the intention of St. Thomas is not
to prove that some sinners are deprived of all actual grace, and
therefore, being unable to avoid all sin, they do commit sin,
and are worthy of punishment; but his intention is to prove
against the Pelagians that a man who remains without sanctifying
grace cannot abstain from sinning. And we see that he is here
certainly speaking of sanctifying grace, for this is that which
alone brings the soul back to the right order.
It is of this
same sanctifying grace that he intends to speak, when he says
immediately after, "Except he be prevented by the assistance of
grace;" by which he means that if the sinner is not
prevented-----that is, is not previously informed [informato]-----by
grace, and brought back to the right order of holding God to be
his last end, he cannot avoid committing fresh sins. And this is
the meaning of the Thomists-----for instance, of Ferrariensis
[Silvestre] and Father Gonet-----in their comments on this
passage. But, without having recourse to other authors, it is
quite clear from what St. Thomas himself says in his Summa,
where he discusses the same point, and brings forward the
identical reasons in the same words as in the 160th Chapter of
his book Contra Gentes; and there he expressly says that he is
only speaking of habitual or sanctifying grace.
And it is impossible that the holy Doctor could have meant
otherwise, since he elsewhere teaches that, on the one hand,
God's grace is never wanting to anyone, as he says in his
commentary on St. John: "But lest you might suppose that this
effect was consequent on the removal of the true light, the
Evangelist, to obviate this opposition, adds, that was the true
light which enlightens every man. For the Word enlightens, so
far as He is concerned, because on His part He is wanting to no
one, but wishes all men to be saved. But if anyone is not
enlightened, this is the fault of the man who turns himself away
from the light that would enlighten him."
And, on the other
hand, he teaches that there is no sinner so lost and abandoned
by grace as not to be able to lay aside his obstinacy, and to
unite himself to the will of God, which he certainly cannot do
without the assistance of grace: "During this life there is no
man who cannot lay aside obstinacy of mind, and so conform to
the Divine will." In another place he says, "So long as the use
of free will remains to a man in this life . . . he can prepare
himself for grace by being sorry for his sins." But no one can
make an act of sorrow for sin without grace. In another place he
says, "No man in this life can be so obstinate in evil but that
it is possible for him to co-operate to his own deliverance."
"To co-operate" necessarily implies grace to co-operate with.
In another place he observes, on the text of St. Paul, "He wills
all to be saved." "Therefore the grace of God is wanting to no
man; but, as far as it is concerned, it communicates itself to
all." Again, on the same words, "God, so far as He is concerned,
is prepared to give grace to all men. . . . Those, therefore,
only are deprived of grace who permit a hindrance to grace to
exist in themselves; and, therefore, they cannot be excused if
they sin." And when St. Thomas says, "God is prepared to give
grace to all," he does not mean actual grace, but only
sanctifying grace.
Cardinal Gotti justly contradicts those who say that God keeps
ready at hand the aids necessary for salvation, but in matter of
fact does not give them to all. Of what use would it be to a
sick man [says this learned author] if the physician only kept
the remedies ready, and then would not apply them? Then he
concludes [quite to the point of our argument] that we must
necessarily say, "God not only offers, but also confers on every
individual, even on infidels and hardened sinners, help
sufficient to observe the Commandments, whether it be proximate
or remote."
For the rest, St. Thomas says that it is only the sins of the
devils and the damned that cannot be wiped out by penance; but,
on the other hand, "to say that there is any sin in this life of
which a man cannot repent is erroneous, because this doctrine
would derogate from the power of grace." [P. 3, q. 86, a. 1] If
grace were wanting to anyone, certainly he could not repent.
Moreover, as we have already seen, St. Thomas expressly teaches
in several places, and especially in his comment on Heb. 12,
that God, as far as He is concerned, refuses to no man the grace
necessary for conversion: "The grace of God is wanting to no
man; but, as far as it is concerned, communicates itself to
all." So that the learned author of the Theology for the use of
the seminary of Peterkau says, "It is a calumny to impute to St.
Thomas that he taught that any sinners were totally deserted by
God."
Bellarmine makes a sound distinction on this point, and says
that for avoiding fresh sins every sinner has at all times
sufficient assistance, at least mediately: "The necessary and
sufficient assistance for the avoidance of sin is given by God's
goodness to all men at all times, either immediately or
mediately. . . . We say "or mediately" because it is certain
that some men have not that help by which they can immediately
avoid sin, but yet have the help which enables them to obtain
from God greater safeguards, by the assistance of which they
will avoid sins." But for the grace of conversion, he says that
this is not given at all times to the sinner; but that no one
will be ever so far left to himself "as to be surely and
absolutely deprived of God's help through all this life, so as
to have cause to despair of salvation."
And so says the theologians who follow St. Thomas-----thus Soto:
"I am absolutely certain, and I believe that all the holy
Doctors who are worthy of the name were always most positive,
that no one was ever deserted by God in this mortal life."
And
the reason is evident; for if the sinner was quite abandoned by
grace, either his sins afterwards committed could no longer be
imputed to him, or he would be under an obligation to do that
which he had no power to fulfill; but it is a positive rule of
St. Augustine that there is never a sin in that which cannot be
avoided: "No one sins in that which can by no means be avoided."
And this is agreeable to the teaching of the Apostle: "But God
is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be tempted above that
which you are able; but will also make with the temptation
issue, that you may be able to bear it." [1 Cor. 10: 13]
The
word "issue" means the Divine assistance, which God always gives
to the tempted to enable them to resist, as St. Cyprian explains
it: "He will make with the temptation a way of escape." And Primasius more clearly: "He will so order the issue that we
shall be able to endure; that is, in temptation He will
strengthen you with the help of His grace, so that ye may be
able to bear it." St. Augustine and St. Thomas go so far as to
say that God would be unjust and cruel if He obliged anyone to a
command which he could not keep.
St. Augustine says, "it is the
deepest injustice to reckon anyone guilty of sin for not doing
that which he could not do." And St. Thomas: "God is not more
cruel than man; but it is reckoned cruelty in a man to oblige a
person by law to do that which he cannot fulfill; therefore we
must by no means imagine this of God." [In 2 Sent. d. 28, q. 1,
a. 3] "It is, however, different," he says, "when it is through
his own neglect that he has not the grace to be able to keep the
Commandments," [De Ver. q. 24, a. 14] which properly means, when
man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, in
order to obtain the proximate grace to enable him to keep the
law, as the Council of Trent teaches: "God does not command
impossibilities; but by commanding admonishes you to do what you
can, and to ask for that which is beyond your power; and by his
help enables you to do it." [Sess. 6, Cap. 11]
St. Augustine repeats his decision in many other places that
there is no sin in what cannot be avoided. In one he says,
"Whether there be iniquity or whether there be justice, if it
was not in the man's power, there can be no just reward, no just
punishment." Elsewhere he says, "Finally, if no power is given
them to abstain from their works, we cannot hold that they sin."
Again, "The devil, indeed, suggests; but with the help of God it
is in our power to choose or to refuse his suggestions. And so,
when by God's help it is in your power, why do you not rather
determine to obey God than him?" Again, "No one, therefore, is
answerable for what he has not received." Again, 'No one is
worthy of blame for not doing that which he cannot do."
Other Fathers have taught the same doctrine. So St. Jerome, "We
are not forced by necessity to be either virtuous or vicious;
for where there is necessity, there is neither condemnation nor
crown." Tertullian: "For a law would not be given to him who had
it not in his power to observe it duly." Marcus the Hermit:
"Hidden grace assists us; but it depends on us to do or not to
do good according to our strength." So also St. Irenaeus, St.
Cyril of Alexandria, St. Chrysostom, and others.
Nor is there any difficulty in what St. Thomas says, that grace
is denied to some persons, in punishment of Original Sin: "To
whomsoever the assistance of grace is given, it is given through
simple mercy; but from those to whom it is not given, it is
withheld justly in punishment of previous sin, or at least of
Original Sin, as Augustine says." For, as Cardinal Gotti well
observes, St. Augustine and St. Thomas are speaking of actual
proximate grace to satisfy the precepts of faith and charity, of
which, indeed, St. Thomas is speaking in this place; but, for
all this, they do not intend to deny that God gives every man
interior grace, by means of which he may at any rate obtain by
prayer the grace of faith, and of salvation; since, as we have
already seen, these holy Doctors do not doubt that God grants to
every man at least remote grace to satisfy the precepts.
Here we
may add the authority of St. Prosper, who says, "All men enjoy
some measure of heavenly teaching; and though the measure of
grace be small, it is sufficient to be a remedy for some, and to
be a testimony for all."
Nor could it be understood otherwise; for if it were true that
any had sinned for want of even remote sufficient grace,
withheld through Original Sin being imputed to them as a fault,
it would follow that the liberty of will, which by a figure of
speech we are said to have had in the sin of Adam, would be
sufficient to make us actual sinners. But this cannot be said,
as it is expressly condemned in the first proposition of Michael
Baius, who said, "That liberty which caused sin to be voluntary
and free in its cause-----namely, in Original Sin, and in the
liberty of Adam when sinning-----is sufficient to [cause] formal
sin [in us], and to make us deserve punishment."
Against this
proposition we may make use of what Bellarmine said, that to
commit a personal sin distinct from the sin of Adam a new
exertion of free will is requisite, and a free will distinct
from that of Adam, otherwise there is no distinct sin; according
to the doctrine of St. Thomas, who teaches, "For a personal sin,
absolute personal liberty is requisite."
Further, with respect
to the Baptized, the Council of Trent has declared that in them
there remains nothing to condemn: "God hates nothing in the
regenerate; for there is no condemnation to them who are truly
buried with Christ by Baptism unto death." And it is added that
concupiscence is not left in us as a punishment, "but for our
trial; and it cannot harm those who do not consent to it." On
the contrary, the concupiscence left in us would do exceedingly
great harm to man, if, on account of it, God denied him even the
remote grace necessary to obtain salvation.
From all this, several theologians conclude that to say that God
refuses to anyone sufficient help to enable him to keep the
Commandments would be contrary to the faith, because in that
case God would oblige us to impossibilities. So says F. Nunez:
"God never refused aid sufficient to keep the commandments,
otherwise they could not be in any way fulfilled; and thus we
should have the heresy of Luther back again, that God has
obliged men to impossibilities"(In 1. 2. q.109, a. 8) And in
another place, "It is of faith, so that the opposite doctrine is
a manifest heresy, that every man, while he is alive, can do
penance for his sins." (In P. 3, q. 86, a. 1, d. 1) And Father
Ledesma, "It is a certain truth of faith, that that is not sin
which is no in the free power of man."(De Aux. q. un. a. 18)
Giovenino says that the sinner becomes guilty through the
exercise of free will, in choosing voluntarily this or that sin;
though at the time he is necessitated to sin because he is
without actual grace sufficient to deliver him from all sin. But
this doctrine, that a man when fallen sins, not having liberty
to do otherwise than to choose what sin he will commit, and is
necessitated to commit some sin, justly offends Monseigneur de
Saleon Archbishop of Vienne, who, in his book Jansenismus
Redivivus, writes as follows: "Who will endure to hear that
a man once fallen, being deprived of grace, can enjoy no other
liberty than that of choosing one sin rather that another, being
necessitated to sin in some way." (P. 2, a, 6) So that a
criminal condemned to death, who has no other liberty allowed
him than to choose whether he will die by the sword, by poison,
or by fire, may be said, when he has made his choice, to die a
voluntary and free death And how can sin be imputed to a man who
must sin in some way or another?
The 67th of the condemned Propositions of Baius
is as follows: "Man sins damnably even in that which he does
through necessity." How can there be liberty, where there is
necessity to sin? Jansenius answers, that the liberty of will,
which by a figure of speech we are said to have had in Adam's
sin, is sufficient to make us sinners. But this too was
condemned in Baius' first proposition, "That liberty;" etc., as
we have seen above.
Our opponents go on to say that though the sinner abandoned by
grace cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, yet he can
avoid each distributively, or individually, "by a simple
suspension or negation of activity,"(91) as they say. But this
cannot be admitted, for several reasons.
First, because when a vehement temptation is assailing us, which
requires much strength to resist, it cannot morally be overcome
(as all theologians agree) except by the assistance of grace, or
else by yielding to another, but opposite, vicious passion; so
that a sinner deprived of grace would be irremediably
necessitated to sin in one or the other way; which it is
horrible to affirm, as we have already shown.
Secondly, when we are urged by a great concupiscence to sin in a
particular way, there is not always -- nay, it seldom happens
that there is -- another improper motive urging us contrary
course, of sufficient force to hinder us from committing the
first sin; so t ~n this second motive is absent or weak, then it
would be necessary for the sinner to commit that particular sin
to which he feels inclined.
Thirdly, this abstaining from sin "by a simple negation of
activity," as they say, can hardly be imagined in sins against
the negative precepts; but, as Trouneley and Gotti well observe,
is altogether impossible in cases where positive precept obliges
us to do some supernatural act; as, for instance, to make an act
of faith, hope, love, and contrition: for as these acts are
supernatural, they necessarily require supernatural assistance
of God to enable us to perform them. So that, at any rate in
this case, if grace were wanting, man would be necessitated to
sin, by not satisfying the positive precept, although he was
unable to avoid the sin. But to assert this is, as F. Bannez
observes, contrary to faith: "A man cannot without having first
actually received an inspiration of divine grace. We assert this
conclusion to be certainly of faith; because no one sins in not
doing that which he cannot do, as it is certain 'de fide;' but a
man to whom nothing more is given than the bare faculties of
human nature has no power to act above nature, and therefore
does not sin in omitting to perform a supernatural act."
Nor will it do to say that if a sinner is deprived of grace, he
is deprived of it by his own fault; and therefore, though he is
deprived of grace, yet he sins. For Cardinal Gotti well replies
to this, that God can justly punish the sinner for his previous
faults, but not for his future transgressions of precepts which
he is no longer able to fulfil. If a servant, he says, were sent
to a place, and if he, through his own fault, fell into a pit,
his master might punish him for his carelessness in falling, and
even his subsequent disobedience, if means (such a rope or
ladder) were given him to get out the pit, and he would not
avail himself of them; but supposing that his master did not
help him to get out, he would be a tyrant if he ordered him to
proceed and punished him for not proceeding. Hence he concludes,
"When, therefore, a man has by sin fallen into the ditch, and
become unable to proceed on his way to eternal life, though God
may punish him for this fault, and also if he refuses the offer
of grace to enable him to proceed; yet if God chose to leave him
to his own weakness, he cannot without injustice oblige him to
proceed on the way, nor punish him if he does not proceed."
Moreover, our opponents adduce many texts of Scripture where
this abandonment is apparently expressed: "Blind the heart of
this people . . . lest they see with their eyes . . . and be
converted, and l heal them. " "We would have cured Babylon, but
she is not healed; let us forsake her.' "And thou iniquity upon
their iniquity, and let them not come into Thy justice. " "For
this cause God delivered them up to shameful affections. He hath
mercy on whom He will; and whom He will He hardeneth;" and
others similar. But it is usually and easily answered to all
these in general, that in the Holy Scriptures God is often said
to do what he only permits; so that if we would not
blaspheme with Calvin, and say that God positively destines and
determines some persons to sin, we must say that God permits
some sinners, in penalty of their faults, to be on the one hand
assailed by vehement temptations [which is the evil from which
we pray God to deliver us when we say, "Lead us not into
temptation"); and, on the other hand, that they remain morally
abandoned in their sin; so that their conversion, and the
resistance they should make to temptation, although neither
impossible nor desperate, is yet, through their faults and their
bad habits, very difficult; since, in their laxity of life, they
have only very rare and weak desires and motions to resist their
bad habit and to regain the way of salvation.
And this the
imperfect obstinacy of the hardened sinner which St. Thomas
describes: "He is hardened who cannot easily co-operate in his
escape from sin and this is imperfect obstinacy, because a man
may be obstinate in this life, if he has a will so fixed upon sin,
that no motions towards good arise, except very weak ones." On the
one side, the mind is obscured, the will is hardened against
God's inspirations, and attached to the pleasures of sense, so
as to despise and feel disgust for spiritual blessings; the
sensual passions and appetites reign in the soul through the bad
habits that have been acquired; on the other side, the
illuminations and the callings of God are, by its own fault,
rendered scarcely efficacious to move the soul, which has so
despised them, and made so bad a use of them, that it even feels
a certain aversion towards them, because it does not want to be
disturbed in its sensual gratifications. All these things
constitute moral abandonment; and when a sinner has once fallen
into it, it is only with the utmost difficulty that he can
escape from his miserable state, and bring himself to live a
well-regulated life.
In order to escape, and pass at once form such disorder to a
state of salvation, a great and extraordinary grace would be
requisite; but God seldom confers such a grace on these
obstinate sinners. Sometimes he gives it, says St. Thomas, and
chooses them for vessels of mercy, as the Apostle calls them, in
order to make known His goodness; but to the rest He justly
refuses it, and leaves them in their unhappy state, in order to
show forth His justice and power:
"Sometimes," says the Angel of the Schools, "out of the
abundance of His goodness He prevents with His assistance even
those who put a hindrance in the way of His grace, and converts
them, etc. And as He does not enlighten all the blind, nor cure
all the sick, so neither does He assist all who place an
impediment to His grace, so as to convert them. "This is what
the Apostle means when he says that God, "to show forth His
anger, and to make His power known, endured with much patience
the vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show
the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy, which He hath
prepared unto glory." [Rom. 9: 22] Then he adds, "But since out
of the number of those who are involved in the same sins, there
are some to whom God gives the grace of conversion, while others
He only endures, or allows to go on in the course of things, we
are not to inquire the reason why He converts some and not
others. For the Apostle says, "Has not the potter power over the
clay, to make of the same mass one vessel to honor; and another
to dishonor? [Ibid., 21]
We do not then deny [to bring this point to a conclusion] that
there is such a thing as the moral abandonment of some obstinate
sinners, so that their conversion is morally impossible; that is
to say, very difficult. And this concession is abundantly
sufficient for the laudable object which our opponents have in
defending their opinion, which is to restrain evil-doers, and to
induce them to consider, before they come to fall into such a
deplorable state. But then it is cruelty [as Petrocorensis well
says] to take from them all hope, and entirely to shut against
them the way of salvation, by the doctrine that they have fallen
into so complete an abandonment as to be deprived of all actual
grace to enable them to avoid fresh sins, and to be converted;
at any rate, mediately by means of prayer [which is not refused
to any man while he lives as we shall prove in the last chapter], whereby they can afterwards
obtain abundant help for placing themselves in a state of
salvation: since the fear of total abandonment would not only
lead them to despair, but also to give themselves more
completely to their vices, in the belief that they are
altogether destitute of grace; so that they have no hope left of
escaping eternal damnation.
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