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We have but one soul, Theotimus, and an indivisible
one; but in that one soul there are various degrees
of perfection, for it is living, sensible and
reasonable; and according to these different degrees
it has also different properties and inclinations by
which it is moved to the avoidance or to the
acceptance of things.
For first, as we see that the vine hates, so to
speak and avoids the cabbage, so that the one is
pernicious to the other, and, on the contrary, is
delighted in the olive; so we perceive a natural
opposition between man and the serpent, so great that
a man's fasting spittle is mortal to the serpent. On
the contrary, man and the sheep have a wondrous
affinity, and are agreeable one to the other. Now
this inclination does not proceed from any knowledge
that the one has of the hurtfulness of its contrary,
or of the advantage of the one with which it has
affinity, but only from a certain occult and secret
quality which produces this insensible opposition and
antipathy, or this complacency and sympathy.
Secondly, we have in us the sensitive appetite,
whereby we are moved to the seeking and avoiding many
things by the sensitive knowledge we have of them;
not unlike to the animals, some of which have an
appetite to one thing, some to another, according to
the knowledge which they have that it suits them or
not. In this appetite resides, or from it proceeds,
the love which we call sensual or brutish, which yet
properly speaking ought not to be termed love but
simply appetite.
Thirdly, inasmuch as we are reasonable, we have a
will, by which we are led to seek after good,
according as by reasoning we know or judge it to be
such. Now in our soul, taken as reasonable, we
manifestly observe two degrees of perfection, which
the great S. Augustine, and after him all the
doctors, have named two portions of the soul,
inferior and superior. That is called inferior which
reasons and draws conclusions according to what it
learns and experiences by the senses; and that is
called superior, which reasons and draws conclusions
according to an intellectual knowledge not grounded
upon the experience of sense, but on the discernment
and judgment of the spirit. This superior part is
called the spirit and mental part of the soul, as the
inferior is termed commonly, sense, feeling, and
human reason.
Now this superior part can reason according to two
sorts of lights; either according to natural light,
as the philosophers and all those who have reasoned
by science did: or according to supernatural light,
as do theologians and Christians, since they
establish their reasoning upon faith and the revealed
word of God, and still more especially those whose
spirit is conducted by particular illustrations,
inspirations, and heavenly motions. This is what S.
Augustine said, namely, that it is by the superior
portion of the soul that we adhere and apply
ourselves to the observance of the eternal law.
Jacob, pressed by the extreme necessity of his
family, let Benjamin be taken by his brethren into
Egypt, which yet he did against his will, as the
sacred History witnesses. In this he shows two wills,
the one inferior, by which he grieved at sending him,
the other superior, by which he took the resolution
to part with him. For the reason which moved him to
disapprove his departure was grounded on the pleasure
which he felt in his presence and the pain he would
feel in his absence, which are grounds that touch the
senses and the feelings, but the resolution which he
took to send him, was grounded upon the reason of the
state of his family, from his foreseeing future and
imminent necessities.
Abraham, according to the inferior portion of his
soul spoke words testifying in him a kind of
diffidence when the angel announced unto him the
happy tidings of a son. Shall a son, thinkest thou,
be born to him that is a hundred years old?(1) but
according, to his superior part he believed in God
and it was reputed to him unto justice.(2) According
to his inferior part, doubtless he was in great
anguish when he was commanded to sacrifice his son:
but according to his superior part he resolved
courageously to sacrifice him.
We also daily experience in ourselves various
contrary wills. A father sending his son either to
court or to his studies, does not deny tears to his
departure, testifying, that though according to his
superior part, for the child's advancement in virtue,
he wills his departure, yet according to his inferior
part he has a repugnance to the separation.
Again, though a girl be married to the contentment
of her father and mother, yet when she takes their
blessing she excites their tears, in such sort that
though the superior will acquiesces in the departure,
yet the inferior shows resistance. We must not hence
infer that a man has two souls or two natures, as the
Manicheans dreamed. No, says S. Augustine, in the 8th
book, 10th chapter, of his Confessions, "but the will
inticed by different baits, moved by different
reasons, seems to be divided in itself while it is
pulled two ways, until, making use of its liberty, it
chooses the one or the other: for then the more
efficacious will conquers, and gaining the day,
leaves in the soul the feeling of the evil, that the
struggle caused her, which we call reluctance (contrecoeur)."
But the example of our Saviour is admirable in
this point and being considered it leaves no further
doubt touching the distinction of the superior and
inferior part of the soul. For who amongst
theologians knows not that he was perfectly glorious
from the instant of his conception in his
virgin-mother's womb, and yet at the same time he was
subject to sadness, grief, and afflictions of heart.
Nor must we say he suffered only in the body, or
only in the soul as sensitive, or, which is the same
thing, according to sense: for he attests himself
that before he suffered any exterior torment, or saw
the tormentors near him, his soul was sorrowful even
unto death. For which cause he prayed that the cup of
his passion might pass away from him, that is, that
he might be excused from drinking it; in which he
manifestly shows the desire of the inferior portion
of his soul; which, dwelling upon the sad and
agonizing objects of the passion which was prepared
for him (the lively image whereof was represented to
his imagination), he desired, by a most reasonable
consequence, the deliverance and escape from them,
which he begs from his Father.
By this we clearly see that the inferior part of
the soul is not the same thing as the sensitive
degree of it, nor the inferior will the same with the
sensitive appetite; for neither the sensitive
appetite, nor the soul insomuch as it is sensitive,
is capable of making any demand or prayer, these
being acts of the reasonable power; and they are,
specially, incapable of speaking to God, an object
which the senses cannot reach, so as to make it known
to the appetite.
But the same Saviour, having thus exercised the
inferior part, and testified that according to it and
its considerations his will inclined to the avoidance
of the griefs and pains, showed afterwards that he
had the superior part, by which inviolably adhering
to the eternal will, and to the decree made by his
heavenly Father, he willingly accepted death, and in
spite of the repugnance of the inferior part of
reason, he said: Ah! no, my Father, not my will, but
thine be done. When he says my will, he speaks of his
will according to the inferior portion, and inasmuch
an he says it voluntarily, he shows that he has a
superior will.
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