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12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the
Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature
is not supremely and immutably good as is the Creator
of it. Thus the good in created things can be
diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished
is evil; still, however much it is diminished,
something must remain of its original nature as long
as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or
however insignificant a thing may be, the good which
is its "nature" cannot be destroyed without the thing
itself being destroyed.
There is good reason, therefore, to praise an
uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an
incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it
would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise.
When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption
is an evil because it is, by just so much, a
privation of the good. Where there is no privation of
the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil,
there is a corresponding diminution of the good.
As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted,
there is good in it of which it is being deprived;
and in this process, if something of its being
remains that cannot be further corrupted, this will
then be an incorruptible entity [natura
incorruptibilis], and to this great good it will have
come through the process of corruption. But even if
the corruption is not arrested, it still does not
cease having some good of which it cannot be further
deprived.
If, however, the corruption comes to be total and
entire, there is no good left either, because it is
no longer an entity at all. Wherefore corruption
cannot consume the good without also consuming the
thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is
therefore good; a greater good if it cannot be
corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the
foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good
even when corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by
corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it
is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in
which to exist.
13. From this it follows that there is nothing to
be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that
wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where
there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective
or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there
is no good. This leads us to a surprising conclusion:
that, since every being, in so far as it is a being,
is good, if we then say that a defective thing is
bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that
what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever
evil and that there is no evil apart from something
good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis
natura bonum est.]
Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil
aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be
nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this
sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the
argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same
time, we must take warning lest we incur the
prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who
call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light
and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the
sweet bitter."(23) Moreover the Lord himself saith:
"An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil
treasure of his heart."(24) What, then, is an evil
man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an
entity?
Now, if a man is something good because he is an
entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good?
When, however, we distinguish between these two
concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because
he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked.
Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man,
evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone
says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a
wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the
prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good
and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault
with God's work, because man is an entity of God's
creation. It also means that we are praising the
defects in this particular man because he is a wicked
person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective
one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far
as it is defective, it is evil.
14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we
call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails
to apply.(25) No weather is both dark and bright at
the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and
sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time
and place, both white and black, nor deformed and
well-formed at the same time. This principle is found
to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries
cannot coexist in a single thing.
Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and
evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist,
but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or
in a thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the
good can exist without evil. For a man or an angel
could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there
cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It
is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to
be wicked. These two contraries are thus coexistent,
so that if there were no good in what is evil, then
the evil simply could not be, since it can have no
mode in which to exist, nor any source from which
corruption springs, unless it be something
corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot
be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than
the deprivation of the good.
Evils, therefore, have their source in the good,
and unless they are parasitic on something good, they
are not anything at all. There is no other source
whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the
case, then, in so far as a thing is an entity, it is
unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible
entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a
corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence
except as an aspect of something that is good. Only
by corrupting something good can corruption inflict
injury.
15. But when we say that evil has its source in
the good, do not suppose that this denies our Lord's
judgment: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruit."(26)
This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth:
"Men do not gather grapes from thorns," since thorns
cannot bear grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we
can see both vines and thorns spring up. Likewise,
just as a bad tree does not grow good fruit, so also
an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a
human nature, which is good in itself, there can
spring forth either a good or an evil will. There was
no other place from whence evil could have arisen in
the first place except from the nature--good in
itself--of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord
himself most clearly shows in the passage about the
trees and the fruits, for he said: "Make the tree
good and the fruits will be good, or make the tree
bad and its fruits will be bad."(27)
This is warning enough that bad fruit cannot grow
on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet from
that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts
of trees can grow. |