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The third evil which comes to the soul through the
natural apprehensions of the memory is privative; for
these apprehensions can hinder moral good and deprive
us of spiritual good.
And, in order that we may first of all explain how
these apprehensions hinder moral good in the soul, it
must be known that moral good consists in the
restraining of the passions and the curbing of
disorderly desires, from which restraint there come
to the soul tranquillity, peace and rest, and moral
virtues, all of which things are moral good.
This restraining and curbing of the passions
cannot be truly accomplished by the soul that forgets
not and withdraws not itself from things pertaining
to itself, whence arise the affections; and no
disturbances ever arise in the soul save through the
apprehensions of the memory. For, when all things are
forgotten, there is naught that can disturb peace or
that moves the desires; since, as they say, that
which the eye sees not the heart desires not.
2. This we are constantly learning by experience;
for we observe that, whenever the soul begins to
think of any matter, it is moved and disturbed,
either much or little, with respect to that thing,
according to the nature of its apprehension. If it be
a troublesome and grievous matter, the soul finds
sadness in it; if pleasant, desire and joy, and so
forth. Wherefore the result of the changing of that
apprehension is necessarily disturbance; and thus the
soul is now joyful, now sad; now it hates, now loves;
and it cannot continue in one and the same attitude
(which is an effect of moral tranquillity save when
it strives to forget all things.
It is clear, then, that knowledge greatly hinders
the good of the moral virtues in the soul.
3. Again, what has been said clearly proves that
an encumbered memory also hinders spiritual good; for
the soul that is disturbed, and has no foundation of
moral good, is to that extent incapable of spiritual
good, which impresses itself only upon souls that are
restrained and at peace.
And besides this, if the soul pays attention and
heed to the apprehensions of the memory -- seeing
that it can attend to but one thing at a time -- and
busies itself with things that can be apprehended,
such as the knowledge of the memory, it is not
possible for it to be free to attend to the
incomprehensible, which is God. For, in order to
approach God, the soul must proceed by not
comprehending rather than by comprehending; it must
exchange the mutable and comprehensible for the
immutable and incomprehensible. |